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Harris v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 107 (Dec. 27, 2018) (en banc)1
CRIMINAL LAW: DEATH PENALTY
Summary
The Court considered whether the admission of gruesome photographs showing the
disfigured bodies of the victims following their deaths and the subsequent autopsies amounted to
an abuse of the district court’s discretion. The Court concluded that admission of these photographs
was an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
Background
On the morning of February 21, 2013, the appellant Ammar Harris was partying at a Las
Vegas nightclub with several women. Kenneth Cherry and Freddy Walters, victims in this case,
were also present at the valet of the club. As Harris was leaving the club with the women, he
remembered that he forgot his jacket and returned to the club to retrieve it. While Harris was
absent, an argument occurred. One of the women with Harris saw a man waving around a gun.
The woman found Harris and told him of the incident. In response, Harris went to his vehicle and
retrieved a firearm from the glovebox and told the woman to use it if necessary. Harris then
approached Cherry’s vehicle, but Cherry drove away from the club.
Harris and the women left the club and drove down the Las Vegas Strip. Harris pulled
alongside Cherry and cut him off. Harris informed his passenger to roll down her window and to
lean back. Harris engaged with Cherry. Harris then fired at Cherry, striking and killing Cherry.
Harris also fired and hit Walters, who did not die but was injured. When the bullet struck and killed
Cherry, his foot pressed the gas pedal and the vehicle accelerated to a rate of roughly eighty-eight
miles per hour. The vehicle collided with several vehicles, ultimately striking a taxicab, which then
burst into flames. The driver of the taxicab, Michael Bolden, and his passenger Sandra Sutton died
from the injuries they sustained in the crash and the subsequent fire.
Harris was charged with the murders of Cherry, Bolden, and Sutton, and with the attempted
murder of Walters. The State sought the death penalty for each of the three (3) murders. Harris
presented a defense of self-defense and a lack of premeditation due to intoxication. The State
successfully argued that surveillance video and other testimony did not show that Cherry or
Walters were acting in any threatening matter. Further, the State successfully argued that even if
Harris was intoxicated, he was not so intoxicated as to be unable to form the requisite intent to be
guilty of first-degree murder. At trial, the jury found Harris guilty. After a penalty hearing, the jury
imposed a sentence of death for each murder. Harris appealed.
Discussion
The admission of the photographs was harmless
The primary issue before the Court was whether the district court abused its discretion
when it admitted photographs of the victims. Harris attempted to exclude the photographs before
trial. The State explained the photographs were necessary to show the manner in which the victims
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were found, the extent of the injuries, and the cause of their deaths. Harris did not dispute any of
these points, but the district court still admitted the photographs despite agreeing that the images
were disturbing. The Court reviewed the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.2
The photographs at issue where highly probative and can thus be admitted regardless of
their graphic content. However, NRS 48.035(1) requires the district court to perform a balancing
test to determine if an evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.3 The Court found the district court did not employ a meaningful weighing of the
potential for unfair prejudice against each photograph’s probative value. Thus, the district court
failed to fulfill its role as a gatekeeper for properly determining, on a case-by-case basis, what
evidence should and should not be admitted.4 The photographs could easily inflame the jury,
tempting them to decide based on emotion rather than reason. The probative value was outweighed
by the unfair prejudice because the State did not need the photographs to prove an important fact
and because the State had other evidence for its case, sufficient to satisfy its burden of proof.
Because the district court abused its discretion, the Court needed to determine if the error
was harmless. Nonconstitutional errors are only reversible if the error, “had a substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”5 The admission of the photographs
was harmless error because most of the events were captured on video and gaps where filled in
with eyewitness testimony.
Other assertions of error
Harris’ other assertions of error included: (1) right to a fair trial was violated when the trial
was broadcasted and reported on by the media; (2) the district court should have been given an
instruction regarding voluntary intoxication; (3) he was entitled to a new trial because the verdict
form did not allow the jury to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter; (4) prosecutorial
misconduct occurred because during the penalty phase, the prosecutor stated that Harris would not
feel remorse in prison and that a life sentence for each victim would mean that Harris would not
be separately punished for killing three people; (5) he should not be eligible for the death penalty
for the murders of Bolden and Sutton because he did not intend to kill them; (6) the district court
should have granted a motion to compel the State to produce data and statistics regarding the death
penalty; and (7) cumulative error deprived him of due process.
The Court briefly analyzed and rejected these arguments, based upon the following: (1)
Harris did not demonstrate that the media coverage of his trial was unduly pervasive nor did he
discuss whether the media coverage deprived him of a fair trial; (2) Harris did not adequately
explain why the instruction regarding voluntary intoxication should have been given; (3) because
the jury was properly instructed on the necessary elements of voluntary manslaughter and there
was overwhelming support for the jury’s decision to find Harris guilty of first-degree murder,
West v. State, 119 Nev. 410, 420, 75 P.3d 808, 815 (2003) (Reviewing a district court’s decision to admit
photographic evidence for an abuse of discretion).
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failure to give a complete verdict form was harmless error; (4) Harris did not object to the
prosecutor’s statement that he would not feel remorse in prison and the appeal did not demonstrate
plain error and regarding the prosecutor’s statement that Harris would not be separately punished
for the murder of three (3) people if granted a life sentence, was objected to and sustained; (5)
Harris’ argument against the death penalty for the deaths of Bolden and Sutton were not welldeveloped or convincing; (6) Harris did not establish that he had a right to the requested
information, nor that he could get the information from other sources; (7) the errors identified by
the Court were unquestionably harmless.
Mandatory review of Harris’ death sentences
NRS 177.055(2) requires the Nevada Supreme Court to determine whether the evidence
supports the aggravating circumstances; whether the verdict of death was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and whether the death sentences are
excessive considering this defendant and the crime.6 The Nevada Supreme Court concluded there
was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict and no relief was warranted.
Conclusion
The Court affirmed the conclusion of the district court case. Although the district court
may have erred in admitting the photographs and other errors were present in the trial, the errors
were harmless. In the presents case, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict in
this case and no relief was warranted.
Dissent
Cherry, J., with whom Gibbons, J., agrees
The majority correctly concluded that a number of errors plagued Harris’ trial, but
incorrectly concluded the verdict was not tainted by such errors. There are three relevant factors
for evaluating a claim of cumulative error: (1) whether the issue of guilt is close; (2) the quantity
and character of the error; (3) the gravity of the crime charged. 7 Applying a heightened level of
security, the dissent is not convinced that the errors were harmless. The dissent focused on two
particular issues, the admission of the photographs and the incomplete verdict form. As for the
admission of the photographs, the dissent concluded that admission of the photographs was not
harmless because the Court could not say with confidence that admission did not influence the
way the jurors interpreted the evidence of Harris’ intent. As for the incomplete jury verdict form,
the dissent was not convinced that the jurors perfectly understood the instructions given and there
was no possibility that the jurors did not follow the instructions. Ultimately, the dissent concluded
the Court should have decided any doubt in favor of the defendant rather than the State.
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